УКАЗАТЕЛЬ ПРОИЗВЕДЕНИЙ ИММАНУИЛА КАНТА В ПРОЕКТЕ ГУТЕНБЕРГ
Составитель: Дэвид Уидджер
CONTENTS
Нажмите на ## перед каждым из названий, чтобы просмотреть оглавление соответствующего тома с гиперссылками.
Нажмите на само название, чтобы открыть исходный файл в Интернете.
## THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
## THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
## FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
## THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
## THE INJUSTICE OF COUNTERFEITING BOOKS
## CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT
## PERPETUAL PEACE
##
PROLEGOMENA
ОГЛАВЛЕНИЯ ТОМОВ
КРИТИКА ЧИСТОГО РАЗУМА
Иммануил Кант
Перевод: Дж. М. Д. Мейклджон
CONTENTS
Preface to the First Edition (1781)
Preface to the Second Edition (1787)
Introduction
I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge
II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in Possession of Certain Cognitions "a priori".
III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge "a priori"
IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.
V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements "a priori" are contained as Principles.
VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason.
VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason.
I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
First Part—TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC
§ 1. Introductory
SECTION I. OF SPACE
§ 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
§ 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.
§ 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions.
SECTION II. OF TIME
§ 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
§ 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time.
§ 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions.
§ 8. Elucidation.
§ 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic.
§ 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic.
Second Part—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic
I. Of Logic in General
II. Of Transcendental Logic
III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic
IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic
FIRST DIVISION—TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC
BOOK I. Analytic of Conceptions. § 2
Chapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Conceptions of the Understanding
Introductory § 3
Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General. § 4
Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements. § 5
Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Categories. § 6
Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conception of the Understanding
Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general § 9
Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. § 10
Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding.
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations given by Sense. § 11.
Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12
The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding. § 13
What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14
The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. § 15
All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one Consciousness. § 16
Observation. § 17
In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only legitimate use of the Category. § 18
Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in general. § 20
Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. § 22
Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding. § 23
BOOK II. Analytic of Principles
INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General.
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT OR, ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES.
Chapter I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.
Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding.
Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements.
Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements.
Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles of the Pure Understanding.
Chapter III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena.
APPENDIX.
SECOND DIVISION—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.
I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC—BOOK I—OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.
Section I-Of Ideas in General.
Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas.
Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC—BOOK II—OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON.
Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.
Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason.
Section I. System of Cosmological Ideas.
Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason.
Section III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-contradictions.
Section IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental Problems.
Section V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems presented in the four Transcendental Ideas.
Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to theSolution of Pure Cosmological Dialectic.
Section VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem.
Section VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the Cosmological Ideas.
Section IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason with regard to the Cosmological Ideas.
I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe.
II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a Whole given in Intuition.
III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.
IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.
Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.
Section I. Of the Ideal in General.
Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale).
Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being.
Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God.
Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God.
Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof.
Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles of Reason.
Appendix. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason.
II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method
Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason.
Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism.
Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics.
Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.
Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs.
Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason.
Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason.
Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.
Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.
Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.
Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason.
КРИТИКА ПРАКТИЧЕСКОГО РАЗУМА
Иммануил Кант
1788
Перевод: Томас Кингсмилл Эбботт
CONTENTS
PREFACE.
INTRODUCTION.
Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason.
FIRST PART — ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.
BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.
CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason.
I. DEFINITION.
REMARK.
II. THEOREM I.
III. THEOREM II.
REMARK I.
REMARK II.
IV. THEOREM II.
REMARK.
V. PROBLEM I.
REMARK.
VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON.
REMARK.
COROLLARY.
REMARK.
VIII. THEOREM IV.
REMARK.
REMARK II.
Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the Foundation of Morality, are:
I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure
II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its Practical use has to an Extension which is not possible to it in its Speculative Use.
CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason.
Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good
Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement.
CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason.
Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.
BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.
CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally.
CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the Conception of the "Summum Bonum".
I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason.
II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason.
III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its Union with the Speculative Reason.
IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.
V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.
VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason Generally.
VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure Reason in a Practical point of view, without its Knowledge as Speculative being enlarged at the same time?
VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason.
IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to his Practical Destination.
SECOND PART. -- METHODOLOGY OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.
Methodology of Pure Practical Reason.
CONCLUSION.
ОСНОВЫ МЕТАФИЗИКИ НРАВСТВЕННОСТИ
Иммануил Кант
1785
Перевод: Томас Кингсмилл Эбботт
CONTENTS
PREFACE
FIRST SECTION—TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
SECOND SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
The Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality
Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Principles of Morality
Classification of all Principles of Morality which can be founded on the Conception of Heteronomy
THIRD SECTION—TRANSITION FROM THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS TO THE CRITIQUE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON
The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of the Will
Freedom must be presupposed as a Property of the Will of all Rational Beings
Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality
How is a Categorical Imperative Possible?
Of the Extreme Limits of all Practical Philosophy.
CONCLUDING REMARK
МЕТАФИЗИКА НРАВОВ
Иммануил Кант
1780
Перевод: Томас Кингсмилл Эбботт
CONTENTS
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics
II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty
REMARK
III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty
IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties?
V. Explanation of these two Notions
A. OUR OWN PERFECTION
B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS
VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action
VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of strict, Obligation
VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties
(1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a duty
(2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also a duty
IX. What is a Duty of Virtue?
X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of Ethics is Synthetical
XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of Virtue may be thus exhibited
XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of Duty generally
A. THE MORAL FEELING
B. OF CONSCIENCE
C. OF LOVE TO MEN
XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics
XIV. Of Virtue in General
XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from Jurisprudence
REMARKS
Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of Internal Freedom.
XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over Oneself
XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength)
REMARK
ON CONSCIENCE
О НЕСПРАВЕДЛИВОСТИ ПЕРЕПЕЧАТКИ КНИГ
Иммануил Кант
CONTENTS
OF THE INJUSTICE OF COUNTERFEITING BOOKS
I. Deduction of the Editor's Right against the Counterfeiter
Proof of the Major
Proof of the Minor
II. Refutation of the Counterfeiter's pretended Right against the Editor.
Proof of the Major
Proof of the Minor
Universal Observation
КРИТИКА СПОСОБНОСТИ СУЖДЕНИЯ КАНТА
Перевод, введение и примечания: Дж. Г. Бернард, доктор богословия, доктор гражданского права, епископ Оссори
CONTENTS
Editor's Introduction
xi
Preface
1
Introduction
7
I.
Of the division of Philosophy
7
II.
Of the realm of Philosophy in general
11
III.
Of the Critique of Judgement as a means of combining the two parts of Philosophy into a whole
14
IV.
Of Judgement as a faculty legislating a priori
17
V.
The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of Judgement
20
VI.
Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the purposiveness of nature
27
VII.
Of the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness of nature
30
VIII.
Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature
35
IX.
Of the connexion of the legislation of Understanding with that of Reason by means of the Judgement
39
First Part.—Critique of the Aesthetical Judgement
43
First Division.—Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement
45
First Book.—Analytic of the Beautiful
45
First Moment of the judgement of taste, according to quality
45
§ ?1.
The judgement of taste is aesthetical
45
§ ?2.
The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is disinterested
46
§ ?3.
The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with interest
48
§ ?4.
The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest
50
§ ?5.
Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction
53
Second Moment of the judgement of taste, viz. according to quantity
55
§ ?6.
The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction
55
§ ?7.
Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of the above characteristic
57
§ ?8.
The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgement of Taste only as subjective
59
§ ?9.
Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object
63
Third Moment of judgements of taste according to the relation of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein
67
§ 10.
Of purposiveness in general
67
§ 11.
The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation)
69
§ 12.
The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds
70
§ 13.
The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion
72
§ 14.
Elucidation by means of examples
73
§ 15.
The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of perfection
77
§ 16.
The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure
81
§ 17.
Of the Ideal of Beauty
84
Fourth Moment of the judgement of taste, according to the modality of the satisfaction in the object
91
§ 18.
What the modality in a judgement of taste is
91
§ 19.
The subjective necessity which we ascribe to the judgement of taste is conditioned
92
§ 20.
The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the Idea of a common sense
92
§ 21.
Have we ground for presupposing a common sense?
93
§ 22.
The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense
94
General remark on the first section of the Analytic
96
Second Book.—Analytic of the Sublime
101
§ 23.
Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that which judges of the Sublime
101
§ 24.
Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the Sublime
105
A.—Of the Mathematically Sublime
106
§ 25.
Explanation of the term "Sublime"
106
§ 26.
Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is requisite for the Idea of the Sublime
110
§ 27.
Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the Sublime
119
B.—Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature
123
§ 28.
Of Nature regarded as Might
123
§ 29.
Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature
130
General remark upon the exposition of the aesthetical reflective Judgement
132
Deduction of [pure] aesthetical judgements
150
§ 30.
The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the Beautiful
150
§ 31.
Of the method of deduction of judgements of taste
152
§ 32.
First peculiarity of the judgement of taste
154
§ 33.
Second peculiarity of the judgement of taste
157
§ 34.
There is no objective principle of taste possible
159
§ 35.
The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement in general
161
§ 36.
Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste
162
§ 37.
What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement of taste
164
§ 38.
Deduction of judgements of taste
165
§ 39.
Of the communicability of a sensation
167
§ 40.
Of taste as a kind of sensus communis
169
§ 41.
Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful
173
§ 42.
Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful
176
§ 43.
Of Art in general
183
§ 44.
Of beautiful Art
185
§ 45.
Beautiful art is an art in so far as it seems like nature
187
§ 46.
Beautiful art is the art of genius
188
§ 47.
Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius
190
§ 48.
Of the relation of Genius to Taste
193
§ 49.
Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius
197
§ 50.
Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of beautiful Art
205
§ 51.
Of the division of the beautiful arts
206
§ 52.
Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product
214
§ 53.
Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful arts
215
§ 54.
Remark
220
Second Division.—Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgement
229
§ 55.
229
§ 56.
Representation of the antinomy of Taste
230
§ 57.
Solution of the antinomy of Taste
231
§ 58.
Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement
241
§ 59.
Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality
248
§ 60.
Appendix:—Of the method of Taste
253
Second Part.—Critique of the Teleological Judgement
257
§ 61.
Of the objective purposiveness of Nature
259
First Division.—Analytic of the Teleological Judgement
262
§ 62.
Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as distinguished from that which is material
262
§ 63.
Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness of nature
268
§ 64.
Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes
272
§ 65.
Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings
275
§ 66.
Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in organised beings
280
§ 67.
Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a system of purposes
282
§ 68.
Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science
287
Second Division.—Dialectic of the Teleological Judgement
292
§ 69.
What is an antinomy of the Judgement?
292
§ 70.
Representation of this antinomy
293
§ 71.
Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy
296
§ 72.
Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of Nature
298
§ 73.
None of the above systems give what they pretend
302
§ 74.
The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of nature dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable
306
§ 75.
The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement
309
§ 76.
Remark
313
§ 77.
Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which the concept of a natural purpose is possible
319
§ 78.
Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature
326
Appendix.—Methodology of the Teleological Judgement
334
§ 79.
Whether Teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the doctrine of nature
334
§ 80.
Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural purpose
336
§ 81.
Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product
342
§ 82.
Of the teleological system in the external relations of organised beings
346
§ 83.
Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system
352
§ 84.
Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of creation itself
359
§ 85.
Of Physico-theology
362
§ 86.
Of Ethico-theology
370
§ 87.
Of the moral proof of the Being of God
377
§ 88.
Limitation of the validity of the moral proof
384
§ 89.
Of the use of the moral argument
392
§ 90.
Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of God
395
§ 91.
Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith
403
General remark on Teleology
414
К ВЕЧНОМУ МИРУ, ФИЛОСОФСКИЙ ОЧЕРК
Иммануил Кант
1795
Перевод, введение и примечания: М. Кэмпбелл Смит
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA
v
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
1
PERPETUAL PEACE
106
FIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES
107
SECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE BETWEEN STATES
117
FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE
143
SECOND SUPPLEMENT-A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE
158
APPENDIX I.-ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE
161
APPENDIX II.-CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS ACCORDING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT
184
INDEX
197
ПРОЛЕГОМЕНЫ
Иммануил Кант
Редактор английского издания: д-р Пол Карус
CONTENTS
PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.
INTRODUCTION.
PROLEGOMENA.
PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL METAPHYSICAL COGNITION.
FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.
HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE?
SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.
HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE?
THIRD PART OF THE MAIN TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.
HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE?
SCHOLIA.
SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE PROLEGOMENA, "HOW IS METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?"
APPENDIX.
back