which does not exclude variety due to education and progress, 66;
irregular actions to be explained by secret operation of contrary causes, 67;
the inconstancy of human action, its constant character, as of winds and weather, 68;
we all acknowledge and draw inferences from the regular conjunction of motives and actions, 69;
history, politics, and morals show this, and the possibility of combining moral and natural evidence shows that they have a common origin, 70;
the reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of actions due to a lingering belief that we can see real connexion behind mere conjunction, 71;
we should begin with the examination not of the soul and will but of brute matter, 72;
the prevalence of the liberty doctrine due to a false sensation of liberty and a false experiment, 72 n;
though this question is the most contentious of all, mankind has always agreed in the doctrine of liberty, if we mean by it that hypothetical liberty which consists in a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of our will, and which can be ascribed to every one who is not a prisoner, 73;
liberty when opposed to necessity, and not merely to constraint, is the same as chance, 74.
B. Both necessity and liberty are necessary to morality, this doctrine of necessity only alters our view of matter and so is at least innocent, 75;
rewards and punishments imply the uniform influence of motives, and connexion of character and action: if necessity be denied, a man may commit any crime and be no worse for it, 76;
liberty also essential to morality, 77.
Objection that doctrine of necessity and of a regular chain of causes either makes God the cause of evil, or abolishes evil in actions, 78;
Stoic answer, that the whole system is good, is specious but ineffectual in practice, 79;
no speculative argument can counteract the impulse of our natural sentiments to blame certain actions, 80;
how God can be the cause of all actions without being the author of moral evil is a mystery with which philosophy cannot deal, 81.
Отрицательный
inconceivability of, 132.
Ньютон
57 n.
Nisus
52 n, 60 n.
Число
the object of demonstration, 131.
Окказиональные причины
theory of, 55.
Параллелизм
between thought and course of nature, 44-5.
Восприятие
and external objects, 119 f. (v. Scepticism, Impression, Idea).
Философия
moral, two branches of, abstruse and practical, 1-5;
gratifies innocent curiosity, 6;
metaphysics tries to deal with matters inaccessible to human understanding, 6.
True, must lay down limits of understanding, 7 (cf. 113);
a large part of, consists in mental geography, 8;
may hope to resolve principles of mind into still more general principles, 9.
Natural, only staves off our ignorance a little longer, as moral or metaphysical philosophy serves only to discover larger portions of it, 26;
academical, or sceptical, flatters no bias or passion except love of truth, and so has few partisans, 34;
though it destroy speculation, cannot destroy action, for nature steps in and asserts her rights, 34;
moral, inferior to mathematics in clearness of ideas, superior in shortness of arguments, 48.
Controversies in, due to ambiguity of terms, 62.
Disputes in, not be settled by appeal to dangerous consequences of a doctrine, 75.
Speculative, entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government, 104 (cf. 114).
All the philosophy in the world, and all the religion in the world, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, can never carry us beyond the usual course of experience, 113.
Happiness of, to have originated in an age and country of freedom and toleration, 102.
Точки
physical, indivisible, 124 n.
Сила
50 f, 60 n. (v. Cause D).
Вероятность
46 f. (v. Cause, B).
Вероятный
arguments, 38, 46 n.
Производство
50 n.
Обещания
not the foundation of justice, 257.
Доказательство
46 n, 86-101 (v. Miracles, Demonstrative).
Провидение
102-115 (v. God).
The sole argument for a divine existence is from the marks of design in nature; must not infer greater power in the cause than is necessary to produce the observed effects, nor argue from such an inferred cause to any new effects which have not been observed, 105;
so must not infer in God more power, wisdom, and benevolence than appears in nature, 106;
so it is unnecessary to try and save the honour of the Gods by assuming the intractability of matter or the observance of general laws, 107;
to argue from effects to unknown causes, and then from these causes to unknown effects, is a gross sophism, 108.
From imperfect exercise of justice in this world we cannot infer its perfect exercise in a future world, 109;
we must regulate our conduct solely by the experienced train of events, 110;
in case of human works of art we can infer the perfect from the imperfect, but that is because we know man by experience and also know other instances of his art, 111-112;
but in the case of God we only know him by his productions, and do not know any class of beings to which he belongs, 113;
and the universe, his production, is entirely singular and does not belong to a known species of things, 115.
Наказание
requires doctrines of necessity and liberty, 76 (v. Necessity).
Пирронизм
126.
Качества
primary and secondary, 122.
Количество
and number, the only objects of demonstration, the parts of them being entirely similar, 131.
Реальный
presence, 86.
Реальность
and thought, 44.
Реализм
of the vulgar, 118.
Разум
(a) opp. intuition, 29;
opp. experience, 28, 36 n.
(b) Corrects sympathy and senses, 117.
No match for nature, 34.
Fallacious, compared with instinct, 45.
Of men and animals, 84 n.
(c) attempts to destroy, by reasoning, 124;
objections to abstract reasoning, 124 f. (v. Scepticism).
(d) Reasoning.
Two kinds of, demonstrative and moral, 30, 46 n, 132;
moral, divided into general and particular, 132;
produces demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities, 46 n.
Probable (v. Cause, 28-32).
Отношения
of ideas, discoverable by the mere operation of thought, independently of the existence of any object, 20.
Религия
a kind of philosophy, 113 (v. Miracles, Providence).
Сходство
19, 41 (v. Similarity).
Сопротивление
and idea of power, 53 n.
Скептицизм
A. antecedent to study and philosophy, such as Descartes' universal doubt of our faculties, would be incurable: in a more moderate sense it is useful, 116 (cf. 129-30);
extravagant attempts of, to destroy reason by reasoning, 124.
No such absurd creature as a man who has no opinion about anything at all, 116;
admits of no answer and produces no conviction, 122 n. (cf. 34, 126, 128).
B. As to the Senses, 117-123.
The ordinary criticisms of our senses only show that they have to be corrected by Reason, 117;
more profound arguments show that the vulgar belief in external objects is baseless, and that the objects we see are nothing but perceptions which are fleeting copies of other existences, 118;
even this philosophy is hard to justify; it appeals neither to natural instinct, nor to experience, for experience tells nothing of objects which perceptions resemble, 119;
the appeal to the veracity of God is useless, 120;
and scepticism is here triumphant, 121.
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is useless, for the supposed primary qualities are only perceptions, 122;
and Berkeley's theory that ideas of primary qualities are obtained by abstraction is impossible, 122, 122 n;
if matter is deprived of both primary and secondary qualities there is nothing left except a mere something which is not worth arguing about, 123.
C. As to Reason, 124-130.
Attempt to destroy Reason by reasoning extravagant, 124;
objection to abstract reasoning because it asserts infinite divisibility of extension which is shocking to common sense, 124,
and infinite divisibility of time, 125;
yet the ideas attacked are so clear and distinct that scepticism becomes sceptical about itself, 125.
Popular objections to moral reasoning about matter of fact, based on weakness of understanding, variation of judgement, and disagreement among men, confuted by action, 126;
philosophical objections, that we only experience conjunction and that inference is based on custom, 127;
excessive scepticism refuted by its uselessness and put to flight by the most trivial event in life, 128.
Mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy useful as a corrective and as producing caution and modesty, 129;
and as limiting understanding to proper objects, 130;
all reasoning which is not either abstract, about quantity and number, or experimental, about matters of fact, is sophistry and illusion, 132.
D, In Religion (v. Miracles, Providence).
Науки
132 (v. Reason, (d); Scepticism, C).
Тайный
powers, 39;
counteracting causes, 47, 67.
Чувства
outward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of thinking--must be corrected by reason, 117.
Scepticism concerning, 117 (v. Scepticism, B).
Подобие
basis of all arguments from experience, 31 (cf. 115).
Твердость
50;
a supposed primary quality, 122.
Душа
and body, 52.
Пространство
and time, 124 f.
Вид
an effect which belongs to no species does not admit of inference to its cause, 115 (cf. 113).
Стоики
34, 79.
Суеверие
6 (v. Providence).
Теология
science of, 132 (v. God, Providence).
Тиллотсон
argument against real presence, 86.
Время
and space, 124 f.
Истина
8, 17 (v. Scepticism).
Рассудок
limits of human, 7;
operations of, to be classified, 8;
opp. experience, 28;
weakness of, 126 (v. Reason, Scepticism).
Добровольность
as ground of distinction between virtues and talents, 130.
Целое
theory that everything is good as regards 'the whole,' 79 80.
Воля
compounds materials given by senses, 13;
influence of over organs of body can never give us the idea of power; for we are not conscious of any power in our will, only of sequence of motions on will, 52;
so with power of will over our minds in raising up new ideas, 53.
Of God, cannot be used to explain motion, 57.
Freedom of (v. Necessity).