See also Collier's Clavis Universalis, p. 6: “Two or more persons who are present at a concert of music may indeed in some measure be said to hear the same notes; yet the sound which the one hears is not the very same with the sound which another hears, because the souls or persons are supposed to be different.” 905. Berkeley seems to hold that in things there is no identity other than perfect similarity—only in persons. And even as to personal identity he is obscure. Cf. Siris, sect. 347, &c. 906. But the question is, whether the very ideas or phenomena that are perceived by me can be also perceived by other persons; and if not, how I can discover that “other persons” exist, or that any finite person except myself is cognizant of the ideal cosmos—if the sort of sameness that Berkeley advocates is all that can be predicated of concrete ideas; which are thus only similar, or generically the same. Unless the ideas are numerically the same, can different persons make signs to one another through them? 907. Omitted in author's last edition. 908. This seems to imply that intercourse between finite persons is maintained through ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, under a tacit faith in divinely guaranteed correspondence between the phenomena of which I am conscious, and the phenomena of which my neighbour is conscious; so that they are practically “the same.” If we are living in a fundamentally divine, and therefore absolutely trustworthy, universe, the phenomena presented to my senses, which I attribute to the agency of another person, are so attributed rightly. For if not, the so-called cosmos is adapted to mislead me. 909. This explanation is often overlooked by Berkeley's critics. 910. Cf. Principles, sect. 82-84. 911. i.e. if you take the term idea in its wholly subjective and popular meaning. 912. i.e. if you take the term idea in its objective meaning. 913. “philosophic,” i.e. pseudo-philosophic, against which he argues. 914. Had this their relative existence—this realisation of the material world through finite percipient and volitional life—any beginning? May not God have been eternally presenting phenomena to the senses of percipient beings in cosmical order, if not on this planet yet elsewhere, perhaps under other conditions? Has there been any beginning in the succession of finite persons? 915. In the first and second editions only. 916. Is “creation” by us distinguishable from continuous evolution, unbeginning and unending, in divinely constituted order; and is there a distinction between creation or evolution of things and creation or evolution of persons? 917. Cf. Siris, sect. 347-349. 918. “Matter,” i.e. Matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the word. 919. Thus Origen in the early Church. That “Matter” is co-eternal with God would mean that God is eternally making things real in the percipient experience of persons. 920. Cf. Principles, sect. 85-156, in which the religious and scientific advantages of the new conception of matter and the material cosmos are illustrated, when it is rightly understood and applied. 921. “substance and accident”—“subjects and adjuncts,”—in the first and the second edition. 922. Cf. Principles, sect. 28-42. In Siris, sect. 294-297, 300-318, 335, 359-365, we have glimpses of thought more allied to Platonism, if not to Hegelianism. 923. “Matter,” i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, finite or Divine. 924. These two propositions are a summary of Berkeley's conception of the material world. With him, the immediate objects of sense, realise in perception, are independent of the will of the percipient, and are thus external to his proper personality. Berkeley's “material world” of enlightened Common Sense, resulting from two factors, Divine and human, is independent of each finite mind; but not independent of all living Mind. 925. “voces male intellectæ.” Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge, “Introduction,” sect. 6, 23-25, on the abuse of language, especially by abstraction. 926. “veterum philosophorum.” The history of ancient speculations about motion, from the paradoxes of Zeno downwards, is, in some sort, a history of ancient metaphysics. It involves Space, Time, and the material world, with the ultimate causal relation of Nature to Spirit. 927. “hujus ævi philosophos.” As in Bacon on motion, and in the questions raised by Newton, Borelli, Leibniz, and others, discussed in the following sections. 928. Sect. 3-42 are concerned with the principle of Causality, exemplified in the motion, or change of place and state, that is continually going on in the material world, and which was supposed by some to explain all the phenomena of the universe. 929. “vis.” The assumption that active power is an immediate datum of sense is the example here offered of the abase of abstract words. He proceeds to dissolve the assumption by shewing that it is meaningless. 930. “principio”—the ultimate explanation or originating cause. Cf. sect. 36. Metaphors, or indeed empty words, are accepted for explanations, it is argued, when bodily power or force, in any form, e.g. gravitation, is taken as the real cause of motion. To call these “occult causes” is to say nothing that is intelligible. The perceived sensible effects and their customary sequences are all we know. Physicists are still deluded by words and metaphors. 931. Cf. sect. 53, where sense, imagination, and intelligence are distinguished. 932. Cf. Principles, Introd. 16, 20, 21; also Alciphron, Dial. VII. sect. 8, 17. 933. [La Materia altro non è che un vaso di Circe incantato, il quale serve per ricettacolo della forza et de' momenti dell' impeto. La forzae l'impeti sono astratti tanto sottili, sono quintessenze tanto spiritose, che in altre ampolle non si possono racchiudere, fuor che nell' intima corpulenza de' solidi naturali, Vide Lezioni Accademiche.]—Author. Torricelli (1608-47), the eminent Italian physicist, and professor of mathematics at Florence, who invented the barometer. 934. Borelli (1608-79), Italian professor of mathematics at Pisa, and then of medicine at Florence; see his De Vi Percussionis, cap. XXIV. prop. 88, and cap. XXVII. 935. “per effectum,” i.e. by its sensible effects—real power or active force not being a datum of the senses, but found in the spiritual efficacy, of which we have an example in our personal agency. 936. “vim mortuam.” The only power we can find is the living power of Mind. Reason is perpetually active in the universe, imperceptible through the senses, and revealed to them only in its sensible effects. “Power,” e.g. “gravitation,” in things, per se, is distinguished from perceived “motion” only through illusion due to misleading abstraction. There is no physical power, intermediate between spiritual agency, on the one hand, and the sensible changes we see, on the other. Cf. sect. 11. 937. “meditatione subigenda sunt.” Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 35, 70. 938. “distingui.” It is here argued that so-called power within the things of sense is not distinguishable from the sensibly perceived sequences. To the meaningless supposition that it is, he attributes the frivolous verbal controversies among the learned mentioned in the following section. The province of natural philosophy, according to Berkeley, is to inquire what the rules are under which sensible effects are uniformly manifested. Cf. Siris, sect. 236, 247, 249. 939. Principia Math. Def. III. 940. De Vi Percussionis, cap. I. 941. “utiles.” Such words as “force,” “power,” “gravity,” “attraction,” are held to be convenient in physical reasonings about the phenomena of motion, but worthless as philosophical expressions of the cause of motion, which transcends sense and mechanical science. Cf. Siris, sect. 234, 235. 942. Cf. sect. 67. 943. “candem.” So in recent discussions on the conservation of force. 944. [Borellus.]—Author. See De Vi Percussionis, cap. XXIII. 945. [Leibnitius.]—Author. 946. On Berkeley's reasoning all terms which involve the assumption that real causality is something presentable to the senses are a cover for meaninglessness. Only through self-conscious experience of personal activity does real meaning enter into the portion of language which deals with active causation. This is argued in detail in sect. 21-35. 947. Our concrete experience is assumed to be confined to (a) bodies, i.e. the data of the senses, and (b) mind or spirit—sentient, intelligent, active—revealed by internal consciousness. Cf. Principles, sect. 1, 2, in which experience is resolved into ideas and the active intelligence which they presuppose. Here the word idea disappears, but, in accordance with its signification, “bodies” is still regarded as aggregates of external phenomena, the passive subjects of changes of place and state: the idealisation of the material world is tacitly implied, but not obtruded. 948. “nihilque,” &c. Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge, e.g. sect. 26, 65, 66. where the essential passivity of the ideas presented to the senses, i.e. the material world, is maintained as a cardinal principle—on the positive ground of our percipient experience of sensible things. To speak of the cause of motion as something sensible, he argues (sect. 24), is merely to shew that we know nothing about it. Cf. sect. 28, 29, infra. 949. The phenomena that can be presented to the senses are taken as the measure of what can be attributed to the material world; and as the senses present only conditioned change of place in bodies, we must look for the active cause in the invisible world which internal consciousness presents to us. 950. “genus rerum cogitantium.” Cf. Principles, sect. 2. 951. “experientia didicimus.” Can the merely empirical data even of internal consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition and bodily motions, without the venture of theistic faith? 952. “a primo et universali Principio” i.e. God, or the Universal Spirit, in whom the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation; in a way which Berkeley does not attempt to unfold articulately and exhaustively in philosophical system. 953. Phys. θ. 4. 255 a 5-7. 954. Princip. Math. Def. III. 955. “resistentia.” Our muscular sensation of resistance is apt to be accepted empirically as itself active power in the concrete, entering very much, as has been said, into the often inaccurate idea of power which is formed. See Editor's Preface. 956. “nec incommode.” Cf. sect. 17, and note. 957. “hypothesis mathematica.” Cf. sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also Siris, sect. 250-251. 958. “nihil.” This section sums up Berkeley's objections to crediting matter with real power; the senses being taken as the test of what is contained in matter. It may be compared with David Hume, Thomas Brown, and J.S. Mill on Causation. Berkeley differs from them in recognising active power in spirit, while with them he resolves causation among bodies into invariable sequence. 959. Can the data presented to us reveal more than sequence, in the relation between our volitions and the corresponding movements of our bodies? Is not the difference found in the moral presupposition, which supernaturalises man in his voluntary or morally responsible activity? This obliges us to see ourselves as absolutely original causes of all bodily and mental states for which we can be morally approved or blamed. 960. “novumque genus.” Cf. sect. 21. We have here Berkeley's antithesis of mind and matter—spirits and external phenomena presented to the senses—persons in contrast to passive ideas. 961. De Anima, I. ii. 13, 22, 24. 962. “Cartesius.” The antithesis of extended things and thinking things pervades Descartes; but not, as with Berkeley, on the foundation of the new conception of what is truly meant by matter or sensible things. See e.g. Principia, P. I. §§ 63, 64. 963. “alii.” Does he refer to Locke, who suggests the possibility of matter thinking? 964. See Aristotle, De Anima, I. ii. 5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI. i. 6. 965. Nat. Ausc. VIII. 15; also De Anima, III, x. 7. 966. Hardly any passage in the Timæus exactly corresponds to this. The following is, perhaps, the most pertinent:—Κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν (p. 34 a). Aristotle quotes the Timæus in the same connexion, De Anima, I. iii. ii. 967. “philosophi Cartesiani.” Secundum Cartesium causa generalis omnium motuum et quietum est Deus.—Derodon, Physica, I. ix. 30. 968. Principia Mathematica—Scholium Generale. 969. “naturam naturantem esse Deum”—as we might say, God considered as imminent cause in the universe. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Opera, vol. XXII. Quest. 6, p. 27. 970. “juxta certam et constantem rationem.” While all changes in Nature are determined by Will, it is not capricious but rational Will. The so-called arbitrariness of the Language of Nature is relative to us, and from our point of view. In itself, the universe of reality expresses Perfect Reason. 971. “permaneret.” Cf. sect. 51. 972. “spectat potius ad philosophiam primam.” The drift of the De Motu is to distinguish the physical sequences of molecular motion, which the physical sciences articulate, from the Power with which metaphysics and theology are concerned, and which we approach through consciousness. 973. “regulas.” Cf. Siris, sect. 231-235. 974. Having, in the preceding sections, contrasted perceived motions and their immanent originating Power—matter and mind—physics and metaphysics—he proceeds in this and the seven following sections to explain more fully what ha means by principium and also the two meanings (metaphysical and mechanical) of solutio. By principium, in philosophy, he understands universally efficient supersensible Power. In natural philosophy the term is applied to the orderly sequences manifested to our senses, not to the active cause of the order. 975. “ratiocinio ... redditæ universales.” Relations of the data of sense to universalising reason are here recognised. 976. “natura motus.” Sect. 43-66 treat of the nature of the effect—i.e. perceptible motion, as distinguished from its true causal origin (principium) in mind or spirit. The origin of motion belongs to metaphysics; its nature, as dependent on percipient experience, belongs to physics. Is motion independent of a plurality of bodies; or does it involve bodies in relation to other bodies, so that absolute motion is meaningless? Cf. Principles, sect. 111-116. 977. “idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima.” The difficulty as to definition of motion is attributed to abstractions, and the inclination of the scholastic mind to prefer these to concrete experience. 978. Motion is thus defined by Aristotle:—Διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν. Nat. Ausc. III. ii; see also i. and iii. Cf. Derodon, Physica, I. ix. 979. Newton. 980. Cf. sect. 3-42. 981. Descartes, Principia, P. II. § 25; also Borellus, De Vi Percussionis, p. 1. 982. “res faciles difficillimas.” Cf. Principles, “Introduction,” sect. 1. 983. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν. Nat. Ausc. III. ii. 984. e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument against the possibility of motion, referred to as a signal example of fallacy. 985. “de infinite, &c.” Cf. Principles, sect. 130-132, and the Analyst passim, for Berkeley's treatment of infinitesimals. 986. “confundere.” Cf. sect. 3-42 for illustrations of this confusion. 987. The modern conception of the “conservation of force.” 988. Aristotle states the question in Nat. Ausc. VIII. cap. i, and solves it in cap. iv. 989. “mutatio loci” is the effect, i.e. motion perceived by sense; “vitale principium” the real cause, i.e. vital rational agency. 990. “moventis et moti,” i.e. as concauses. 991. “motum localem.” Sect. 52-65 discuss the reality of absolute or empty space, in contrast with concrete space realised in perception of the local relations of bodies. The meaninglessness of absolute space and motion is argued. Cf. Principles, sect. 116, 117. See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15, 17; also Papers which passed between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in 1715-16, pp. 55-59; 73-81; 97-103, &c. Leibniz calls absolute space “an ideal of some modern Englishman.” 992. Newton's Principia, Def. Sch. III. See also Derodon, Physica, P. I. cap. vi. § 1. 993. Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and the “possibility of space existing without matter,” Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13. 994. Note the account here given of imagination and intellect, as distinguished from sense, which may be compared with αἴσθησις, φαντασία, and νοῦς in Aristotelian psychology. 995. “attributorum divinorum particeps.” See Samuel Clarke, in his Demonstration, and in the Papers between Clarke and Leibnitz. 996. “nostrum,” sc. corpus. When we imagine space emptied of bodies, we are apt to forget that our own bodies are part of the material world. 997. [Vide quæ contra spatium absolutum disseruntur in libro De Principiis Cognitionis Humanæ, idiomate anglicano decem abhine annis edito.]—Author. He refers to sect. 116 of the Principles. 998. He treats absolute space as nothing, and relative space as dependent on Perception and Will. 999. Phys. α. 5. 188a. 22, 23. 1000. See Locke, Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10. 1001. Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed ejection of motion from the striking body into the body struck. Is this only metaphorical? Is the motion received by the latter to be supposed identical with, or equivalent to, that given forth by the former? 1002. Principia, Def. IV. 1003. Lezioni Accademiche. 1004. De Vi Percussionis, cap. IX. 1005. Newton's third law of motion. 1006.
Berkeley sees in motion only a link in the chain which connects the sensible and intelligible worlds—a conception unfolded in his Siris, more than twenty years later. 1007. “provincia sua.” The De Motu, so far as it treats of motion perceptible to the senses, is assigned to physics; in contrast to theology or metaphysics, alone concerned with active causation.
The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4. by George Berkeley